A Tactical Silver Lining in a Horrifying Storm: Canadian Airlift in Rwanda, 1994 (RCAF Journal - WINTER 2016 - Volume 5, Issue 1)

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Major James Pierotti, CD



In 1994, a small Canadian tactical-airlift mission provided a glimmer of hope throughout the tragedy in Rwanda. The horrific Rwandan genocide started on 7 April and lasted over 100 days, with most of the world sitting idly by as 800,000 to 1,000,000 people in the country were raped, unspeakably mutilated and slaughtered.[1] In the midst of the genocide, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) stoically remained in place with a small force numbering roughly 460 personnel under the command of Canadian Major-General (MGen) Romeo Dallaire. UNAMIR watched as nations arrived with aircraft in early April, only to load their own civilian and military personnel and immediately depart.[2] The logistical support UNAMIR required to remain in Rwanda, and throughout the genocide until 18 July, came solely from a small Canadian air-transport detachment in Nairobi, Kenya.[3] The UNAMIR mission has been relatively well documented, but there has been little to nothing written about the successful airlift that kept the UNAMIR mission supplied. An examination of the airlift in Rwanda is a useful case study for the suitability of Canadian tactical airlift as a response to international crises.

Contemporary airlift missions are nearly always conducted by a coalition of willing nations where the dangers are assessed through comprehensive intelligence and the risks are shared among participating military forces. What makes the Rwanda mission unique is that the other military airlift partners departed within two weeks of the start of the air evacuation on 9 April. An analysis of the Canadian airlift to Rwanda, called Operation (Op) SCOTCH, provides some important lessons on what a tactically trained and properly equipped transport capability can achieve despite dangerous conditions.

After 7 April 1994, the United Nations (UN) requirement for logistical support in Rwanda was critical. UNAMIR became a strategic enabler for the international community to ultimately get involved with the genocide’s resulting refugee crisis. During the genocide, UNAMIR helped save thousands of lives, and after the genocide, it was the initial coordinating agency to feed and support millions of displaced refugees.[4] The Canadian Air Lift Command Element (ALCE) detachment from 8 Wing Trenton, Ontario, provided the tactical airlift, working with UNAMIR to manage aircraft risk and keep the UN presence in Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda.

The initial response to the developing genocide

In order to understand the mission, it is necessary to understand a bit about the underlying reasons for the tragedy in Rwanda. The ethnic hatred displayed by the 85 per cent Hutu majority towards the 15 per cent Tutsi population existed since the late 1800s and was exacerbated by Belgian colonial power, which had insisted that the Tutsi population was “approaching, however gradually, the exalted level of white people in contrast with the declared brutishness and innate inferiority of the Bantu (Hutu) majority.”[5] The Tutsis benefited from Belgian preferential treatment until the Europeans withdrew from Rwanda in 1962 and the subsequent election—resulting from a violent reaction to wide-spread discrimination—of a Hutu-dominated government.[6] As the government became increasingly hostile towards the Tutsi minority (a situation that was complicated by the same ethnic tensions in surrounding countries), the Tutsis formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1988 under the direction of MGen Paul Kagame. The RPF initiated a civil war against the Hutu Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) in 1990.[7]

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UNAMIR was established in October 1993 to enable a brokered ceasefire between the two sides of the civil war and to assist in implementing the Arusha Accord, a peace-process agreement developed in August 1993.[8] However, the implementation of the accord did not gain acceptance on either side, and in March of 1994, MGen Dallaire reported that the situation was deteriorating.[9] Western nations did not understand at the time that the ethnic tensions had achieved genocidal levels of anger and that the Interahamwe militia, passively supported by the RGF, planned to eliminate the Tutsi minority.[10]

On 6 April, the matter came to a head when the Rwandan Hutu President, Juvenal Habyarimana, was killed when his aircraft was shot down on approach to Kigali airport.[11] The RGF and the government-controlled radio station claimed that the RPF and the Belgians were responsible for the assassination, a claim since proven to be a lie, and Radio Rwanda urged the Hutu population to rise up against the Tutsis.[12] On 7 April, murderous groups of Hutu militia—urged forward by “hate radio”[13]—started killing Tutsis by the thousands. The initial round of killings included 10 Belgian peacekeepers, who were tortured and slaughtered while protecting the Rwandan Prime Minister, a Tutsi.[14] These events caused Western governments to immediately fear for the safety of their personnel within Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi. Both Canada and Belgium started plans for an air evacuation, with Belgium evacuating both civilians and military peacekeepers.

The destruction of the aircraft with the president onboard was a source of considerable concern for any airlift evacuation. Handheld and highly portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were now in use in the vicinity of Kigali airport, but no one knew for certain by whom. However, Canada had recently equipped several CC130 Hercules with a countermeasures system (CMS) that warned the aircrew if missiles were fired at the aircraft and provided additional active-defensive measures.[15] This capability was used in early April 1994 at Ancona, Italy, during relief missions into Sarajevo—in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia—and allowed procedures and tactics to be developed and refined.

The most obvious changes to the aircraft were: armour plating in the cockpit and on the paratroop doors to protect crewmembers from projectiles, sensors to monitor radar and infrared threats, and a CMS that was capable of deceiving missiles aimed at the aircraft. The crews were trained to operate at high speed and low altitudes, evade threats and minimize time on the ground to reduce the ability of enemy forces to target the aircraft.[16] Due to the equipment and training, the CMS-equipped CC130 Hercules was the only Canadian cargo aircraft suitable for the environment, so it was selected to aid in the evacuation of Canadian and Belgian personnel at the beginning of the crisis in Rwanda.

In Canada, a warning order was issued to Air Transport Group (ATG) on 8 April to prepare to provide a CMS-equipped Hercules aircraft to evacuate personnel.[17] The next day, formal direction was provided from the Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), through the Department of National Defence (DND), to evacuate Canadians and Belgians from Kigali.[18] The only CMS-equipped Hercules resource operating outside of Canada in April 1994 was at Ancona.[19] The Canadian Detachment at Ancona was composed of an ALCE, two CMS-qualified aircrew and support personnel to load and maintain the aircraft.[20] All 28 personnel departed immediately for Nairobi. On 10 April, they attempted the first evacuation flight out of Bujumbura, Burundi, but unfortunately, the personnel they were to evacuate were delayed in Rwanda.[21] This small deployment, centred on one aircraft, evacuated 211 UN personnel by 11 April long before a Hercules could have arrived all the way from Canada.[22] The re-allocation of the aircraft already overseas allowed for the use of assets where the need was greatest.

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Concurrently, ATG decided that it was too risky to conduct the evacuation with a single aircraft, as serviceability issues or damage from small-arms fire could ground the aircraft.[23] As well, the Hercules required four hours for each round trip, and it was unsafe to land in Kigali at night, so one aircraft meant a maximum of two flights per day.[24] The Canadian Forces (CF) augmented the small detachment with one additional Hercules and crew, plus command and support personnel. The two CMS Hercules and three CMS-qualified aircrews with all necessary support personnel were in place in Nairobi on 13 April.[25] French troops secured the Kigali airport on 9 April, permitting the operation of Belgian and Canadian airlift assets in a reduced-threat environment. Once a truce was agreed to, the civilians were quickly evacuated on 12 April.[26] The Belgian government then pulled out its contingent, reducing UNAMIR from 2,539 military personnel on 22 March to 1,705 by 19 April.[27] The evacuation of personnel meant that relief supplies could only be brought in to UNAMIR on a “non-interference basis” with the primary evacuation mission.[28] UNAMIR would become a priority immediately after the evacuation, as the mission had as little as 12 days’ worth of food and water supplies at minimum rations.[29]

Over the course of the genocide, UNAMIR was essential for the eventual de-escalation of the crisis. Dallaire and his staff did everything in their power to inform the media and the international community of the events in Rwanda.[30] UNAMIR blocked convoys—when they could—to allow refugees time to escape from advancing militia and RGF troops, which in Dallaire’s estimation, saved upwards of 10,000 people.[31] UNAMIR provided necessary security at the airport for medical evacuations[32] and was the initial supporting force to direct aid to the millions of refugees displaced by the massacres. Most importantly, it provided a UN presence and acted as an intermediary between the warring factions by maintaining lines of communications. These activities provided a limited international response that was crucial when an expanded mission was authorized in June. The role of UNAMIR as witness, informer and refugee coordinator required airlift support in order to remain in theatre.

As the violence continued unabated, the UN Security Council decided on 21 April to reduce UNAMIR to approximately 270 personnel, and the ALCE was tasked to support the withdrawal of approximately 1,300 peacekeepers.[33] As the ALCE was due to depart when the reduction of UNAMIR was complete, MGen Dallaire made a request to Vice-Admiral Lawrence Murray, the Canadian Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, to keep the Canadian airlift in Nairobi, as no other nation was assisting UNAMIR and insurance for UN-chartered aircraft was in danger of being withdrawn.[34] The Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien, approved the continued support of the Canadian airlift, and the continuation of the mission was communicated to the ALCE on 22 April.[35] It appears that the presence of a Canadian commander on the ground in Rwanda translated into action by the Canadian government to support UNAMIR as a way to prove Canada could lead UN missions. This was very welcome news for UNAMIR, as the UN-chartered flights were mostly cancelled after 24 May due to the continuing insurance problems as a direct result of violence near the airport. The Canadian Hercules was a reliable form of support that would continue to promote Canadian and UN objectives.

On 22 April, the evacuation of troops escalated. The Canadian ALCE flew five missions and evacuated 374 passengers followed by another four missions and 353 passengers the next day.[36] This amounted to half of the evacuation of peacekeepers, as approximately 1,300 military personnel left Rwanda after the Security Council decision. At least one of the flights exceeded the seat count of a Hercules, but the Bangladeshi soldiers were told to sit back-to-back, and cargo straps were used around rows of soldiers to keep them as safe as possible during take-off and landing.[37] This procedure was authorized at the outset of the evacuation and remains an important capability of the Hercules, which can carry cargo loads one way and passengers the other, by varying the internal configuration of the aircraft as needed.[38] The flexibility of the cargo area meant that Canadian evacuation objectives and UN support objectives could be carried out on the same round trip.

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The ALCE used both Hercules to maximum effect prior to reducing the detachment back down to one aircraft, as per the direction from ATG.[39] Two factors were at work. First, the airlift in Ancona was without a serviceable aircraft and there was pressure to restart the airlift into Sarajevo, so an aircraft from Nairobi needed to return to that theatre.[40] Second, UNAMIR had been reduced to such a small size that two aircraft would not be fully employed.[41] Therefore, on 1 May, the second Hercules departed Nairobi for Ancona and left a detachment of 41 Canadian personnel to support UNAMIR.[42] The smaller ALCE remained sufficient for the basic needs of UNAMIR.

The situation in Kigali worsened. On 3 May, UNAMIR reported that two Ghanian peacekeepers were injured and required medical evacuation. During the evacuation the next day, a mortar round landed 800 metres from the aircraft, and UNAMIR Headquarters took small-arms fire.[43] The aircrew reported being fired upon but was able to take on a third injured soldier and depart safely. Dallaire closed the airport due to the incident, and that ended any further discussion on insurance for UN-chartered aircraft, as the risks were deemed too high for civilian operations.[44] The airport would not reopen to civilian aircraft until well after the genocide and civil war were concluded on 18 July.

The Canadian ALCE had practically become the sole lifeline for UNAMIR on 24 April, but as of 5 May, the deteriorating situation at the airfield meant that the Canadians had to go it alone.[45] The initial evacuation of civilians and military had demonstrated an important aspect of airlift, but it was an aspect that was conducted by both military and civilian transport aircraft. The increasing fighting around the airport made the use of civilian aircraft too dangerous, and the UN knew that it had to rely on military transport aircraft after 5 May. The inability of civilian aircraft to land in Rwanda demonstrated that there are some missions that can be supported only by tactical military transport aircraft.

A small tactical airlift in a dangerous area

Transport aircraft, military or not, assist an operation with the delivery of supplies, personnel transfers and medical evacuations. The military tactical airlift was able to provide support despite the risks both in the air and on the ground. The risks involved were managed by both the ALCE and UNAMIR, which had effective procedures to allow the Hercules to land and depart relatively safely, despite the fact that the airport was in the middle of the battle area. These procedures were necessary to allow for continued airlift, as the UNAMIR mission was essential to ongoing communications between the UN and the warring factions. The airlift was a critical component of the continued ability of UNAMIR to operate in Rwanda, and multiple sources make it clear that without the airlift, UNAMIR would have had to withdraw in May or June.[46]

The primary requirement of UNAMIR from the ALCE was the transport of food, water and supplies. As there were 400–500 personnel to support at any given time, it might appear that one aircraft was insufficient. However, the aircraft was rarely used to its full capacity.[47] Problems were encountered with the UN logistics resupply efforts shortly after the airlift commenced; cargo capacity exceeded the supplies provided, and logistics problems continued until July. Compounding these difficulties was customs in Nairobi, which required days to clear loads from outside the country for distribution to Kigali.[48] The problem of acquiring loads for UNAMIR became a regular entry in ALCE situation reports (SITREPs) and was not resolved while Canada was the only airlift detachment supporting the UN operation. This meant that the ALCE of one aircraft and two crews was sufficient for the task assigned, even though UNAMIR required more supplies than were available to airlift. Had the UN been more efficient, the requirement for a second aircraft could have been revisited.

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The ALCE planned to fly two missions into Kigali every day. However, many of these were cancelled due to heavy fighting around the airport. Each flight could carry 25,000 pounds (lbs) or 11,340 kilograms (kg) of freight and up to 12 passengers, both in and then out of Kigali, which was a total capability of 50,000 lbs [22,680 kg] and 24 passengers.[49] In the month of May, 26 flights were flown with an average of 19,260 lbs [8,736 kg] and 15 passengers, which includes all the freight and passengers returning to Nairobi. The aircraft was not used as often as it could have been flown. The limitation, however, was not the airlift; it was the airport availability in Kigali and the loads available from the UN for distribution to Kigali. However, the basic needs of UNAMIR were met by the available airlift.

Dallaire reopened the Kigali airport on 7 May, and the aircraft operated under heightened risk, as the people around the city continued to be ravaged by the massacres. Roving death squads made it difficult for UNAMIR troops to move from the stadium to the airport to provide convoy security. Aircrews reported hundreds if not thousands of bodies floating down the Nyabarongo River during flights to Kigali. As the airport was heavily mined, movement was restricted to paved areas. The importance of this restriction was demonstrated when a dog running in the open area between a runway and taxiway was killed by a mine on 31 July.[50] At the end of July, when Canadian military personnel reopened the air traffic control tower, they found chunks of flesh all over the walls and puddles of dried blood from one of the battles in May.[51] Through May and into June, Dallaire and the Secretary-General of the UN knew the scope of the tragedy, but there was a strategic failure in obtaining sufficient action from the Security Council.[52]

In early May, MGen Kagame’s RPF had taken the high ground around Kigali and systemically shelled RGF positions throughout the city, avoiding a direct fight against a numerically superior foe. Kagame’s plan was to tie up as many RGF troops as he could in Kigali while his troops slowly won and methodically took control of the country.[53] While the massacres continued in the interim, he was willing to take the time necessary for a complete victory. He believed that the only way to lasting peace was for total victory over the RGF troops and a new government, despite the cost he knew his fellow Tutsis would suffer.[54] The result of the shelling from the RPF and the military reprisals from the RGF meant that approval had to be received from both sides for Canadian aircraft to land, otherwise the risk to the crew and aircraft was too high.

Flight approval from both factions did not eliminate the threat to the aircraft while arriving or departing the area.[55] The aircrew used a combination of tactics to minimize the risk.[56] One tactic was to approach the airport at high level and conduct a steep approach to the runway, but this technique left the crew open to the dangerous potential threat of SAMs, as the CMS was not effective at slow speeds.[57] Another tactic was to approach at low level and high speed. The advantage of this tactic was that it minimized the threat from the handheld missiles, but it did put the crew in range of small-arms fire. The high speed and very low altitude—sometimes lower than 200 feet (61 metres) above the ground—made it very difficult to target the aircraft. Whichever tactic was taken, it was combined with varying routes in and out for reduced predictability.

The tactics worked. Handheld missiles were not used after the 6 April incident, which suggested that the warring factions were not willing to alienate the international community by destroying a UN-employed transport aircraft. Small arms were used against the airlift, but how frequently remains unknown.[58] Only one bullet hit a Hercules during the airlift.[59] That bullet was discovered on 24 May. It had hit a spar on the wing, but testing indicated that the structure was sound. Flying resumed with crews confident that random bullets would not cripple the aircraft, and the crews had classified tactics they could use against sustained small-arms fire.[60] Despite the threat posed by violent and angry personnel on the ground, the tactics that had been developed by ATG were used successfully and avoided injuries and accidents.

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Safety in flight is important, but transport aircraft are most vulnerable on the ground when loading and unloading takes place. In Rwanda, only one aircraft was on the ramp at Kigali airport at any given time during the genocide, and this benefit was exploited by the Canadian crews. Crews used a combat offloading technique to quickly deposit pallets of cargo on the ground without the use of forklifts or any outside equipment or assistance.[61] The aircraft would stop briefly, release the locks holding in one pallet, and then release the brakes and accelerate, which would launch the pallet off the ramp of the Hercules so that it could land upright on the tarmac. There were up to four pallets on board, but each pallet could be dispatched in seconds. Once the aircraft was empty, UNAMIR could board personnel, and a forklift could load the outgoing cargo pallets. From the moment the aircraft touched down until the time it took off, only eight minutes would elapse on a typical mission using this technique.[62] The engines would remain running, and the aircraft was nearly always in motion. The fast turnaround times allowed the warring factions little time to target and damage the aircraft.

Eight minutes, however, was still a long time on the ground when an aircraft was at its most vulnerable. On 5 June, despite clearance from both sides for the aircraft to land, elements of the RGF fired a mortar at the Hercules as it was offloading. The aircraft aborted the offloading sequence and taxied for an immediate departure. As the Hercules was on its take-off roll, a second round landed exactly where the aircraft had stopped. Dallaire witnessed the event and knew that the aircraft had been the target, so he shut down the airport to further flights.[63] The closure of the airport created a dangerous phase for UNAMIR, as the airport would remain unsafe for a month and another route for supplies needed to be found.

As the RPF continued its advance throughout the rest of Rwanda, desperation was becoming evident in the actions of the RGF. Furthermore, the airport would remain closed until after the RPF captured the airport and city on 4 July. The ALCE had previously devised a plan to use Entebbe, Uganda, in the event the airport in Kigali proved too dangerous.[64] Supplies for UNAMIR were always desperately short, so the ALCE flights commenced into Entebbe the day after the mortar incident.[65] UNAMIR had no alternative but to organize a convoy of trucks to pick up the supplies and drive them into Kigali. The first supplies arrived at the UNAMIR compound on 8 June, and the new convoy route was established, although this increased the reaction time from logistical requirement to delivery.[66]

The Kigali airport did not reopen to Canadian crews until 6 July after the RPF had consolidated control of the airport and surrounding area and provided approval.[67] However, an exception was made in the interim for medical evacuations, and one such mission took place into Kigali on 17 June.[68] A rocket-propelled grenade had been deliberately fired by RGF troops at UNAMIR troops, and two peacekeepers had been injured. One died before the Hercules arrived, but the other survived. It was incidents such as this that were of massive significance to the troops under Dallaire’s command. It was one thing to put one’s life on the line for the mission, but quite another if there was no way to get one to qualified medical care. This type of mission was a critical component of the ALCE’s overall offering to UNAMIR, and there was always a flight crew on standby to support medical evacuations.[69]

Apart from supplies, the airlift brought in replacement personnel and facilitated contingent rotations of troops, which were necessary to the long-term commitment of UNAMIR.[70] As the aircraft were flying back and forth regardless, UNAMIR was able to take advantage and send overworked staff to Nairobi to give personnel a much-needed three-day rest. The supply flights also allowed for dignitaries and high-ranking individuals to go to Kigali to see the horrors themselves. Vice-Admiral Murray and the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Robert Fowler, were two such visitors who determined “Kigali [was] in dire need of food and medical supplies.”[71] Their visit was critical to decisions, such as the amount of Canadian airlift required for the planned June expansion of UNAMIR. The communication provided by transport aircraft missions was a critical component throughout the crisis.

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Some missions were special to all involved. UNAMIR and the ALCE coordinated with international organizations, and they made arrangements for 31 children to be evacuated to Paris. The children were successfully evacuated on 4 June, but they had to wait six hours on the aircraft in Nairobi because customs would not allow them on Kenyan soil and the French had timed their flight to arrive in Paris at noon to maximize media exposure.[72] Nations other than Canada were not yet cognizant of the massive scope of the unfolding disaster, and France appeared to be looking for ways to highlight a good deed with limited involvement. Still, at least an international focus on Rwanda had started.

On 17 May, the UN Security Council authorized a massive increase of up to 5,500 peacekeepers for Rwanda, but the resolution was gutted by an American demand that observers be sent first and a ceasefire brokered, which the RPF would not endorse.[73] Over the following weeks, it appeared as if those American requirements would disappear due to increased international pressure, so the Canadian government sent a second Hercules and a third crew on 17 June to assist with the build-up.[74] However, France decided to launch its own peace-enforcement mission into one corner of the country, and that delayed the expansion of UNAMIR, as the UN waited to see if that mission would be sufficient to resolve the violence.[75]

The build-up was again delayed, so the Canadian second Hercules was sent home on 2 July.[76] The French mission secured the southwest corner of Rwanda but was at odds with UNAMIR due to past French support of the RGF, which infuriated the RPF.[77] This complicated the situation until the RPF secured Kigali on 4 July, when UN discussions began in earnest to assist with the expanding humanitarian emergency.[78] MGen Kagame and the RPF secured total victory of Rwanda on 18 July, but the cost of the victory was extraordinary. The Secretary-General of the UN summarized the situation in early August:

The protracted violence in Rwanda has created an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 people have been killed [later upgraded to a minimum of 800,000], 3 million displaced internally and more than 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries. Although the flight of people seems to have slowed, the situation remains volatile and extremely fluid. Of particular concern is the possibility of another massive outflow from the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda when the French forces withdraw.[79]

Once the fighting was over, the world responded to the massive refugee crisis as starvation and disease became rampant, but even then the actual arrival of troops took time. It was not until 31 July that the expansion of UNAMIR finally started en masse, and on 1 August, the Kigali airport was opened to civilian flights.[80] Nearly four months after the beginning of the crisis, the world had arrived. UNAMIR expanded to 5,500 troops with the new name UNAMIR II and was tasked with taking the lead on the humanitarian response, assisting refugees until October when the mission was deemed to be no longer required. The ALCE continued right until the end of September and completed the mission with a total of 312 flights, 5,871,200 lbs [2,663,131.5 kg] of cargo delivered and 6,340 passengers carried.[81] Despite the importance of the initial evacuation and the assistance to the refugee crisis, the most important contribution of the Canadian effort was the airlift during the genocide.

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The Canadian airlift in context

The Canadian airlift was the sole lifeline of UNAMIR from 24 April until 31 July. During that time, the ALCE flew 137 flights and transported 2,357,500 lbs [1,069,344 kg] of cargo and 2,409 passengers.[82] For most of the period, there was only one aircraft assigned to the detachment. Without this support, one can conclude that UNAMIR would not have been able to remain in Rwanda. The factors involved in national decisions on Rwanda bear scrutiny to gather insight on the lack of support initially provided by most first-world nations. Given the likelihood of a similar situation arising in the future, the employment of a small ALCE along the lines of the one employed in Rwanda or an enhanced capability using current resources should be examined.

Given all that the Canadian airlift in Rwanda accomplished, it would be easy to exaggerate Canada’s role. The mission was initiated to evacuate Canadians and Belgians from Rwanda, and it was only when it was realized that no one else was staying to support UNAMIR, coupled with a direct request from MGen Dallaire, that Canada authorized the ALCE to remain. Even then the extensions were provided only one or two weeks at a time, allowing Cabinet and DND time to review other options.[83] The reality is that there were other concerns at the time, including Canadian military peacekeepers taken hostage by Serbian armed forces in the former Yugoslavia. In the opening weeks of the conflict, the hostage situation occupied more time in the House of Commons than did debate on Rwanda.[84]

In addition, the government was deeply concerned about the defence budget, as it was in the process of reducing military expenses by $2.3 billion.[85] This concern over cost is evident in the initial faxes between DND and DFAIT, the latter making it clear that the cost of the initial deployment of the second Hercules would have to be absorbed by DND.[86] However, the government increased aid by $4 million on 26 April, and by that date, costs were no longer a factor in airlift decision making.[87] In light of the ever-expanding humanitarian crisis developing in Rwanda and just outside its borders, Canada announced another $10 million in aid to the victims on 21 July.[88] Regardless of these factors, the number of Canadian aircraft in theatre appears to have always matched UNAMIR’s basic needs, mostly due to the inability of the UN to increase the quantity of supplies available for airlift.

Outside of Africa, airlift was important to another major UN operation.[89] Coalition operations into the former Yugoslavia had been ongoing since 1992, and “by the end of 1993, over 345,000 Bosnians depended on air-dropped supplies for their survival.”[90] On 5 February 1994, the world was shocked to learn of the market massacre when 68 people were killed in a deliberate strike against civilians.[91] Canada had a large contingent of troops in Bosnia, and CMS airlift resources were required in that operation as well.[92] Due to manning concerns, as the tactical crews were heavily tasked, the compromise solution was to provide detachments to both UNAMIR and the operation in the former Yugoslavia.[93] Both detachments were kept at one aircraft and two crews unless specific surges were required. The small detachments allowed ATG to support both operations.

Canada’s participation in both operations, although small, was effective, as most nations waited far too long to get involved in Rwanda with a large commitment. In particular, the United States (US) deserves the significant criticism it has received for its delaying tactics against UNAMIR expansion.[94] The US had taken 18 casualties in Somalia the year prior and was clearly not about to get involved in another African mission where American lives may have been at risk.[95] At the same time, the US implemented Presidential Decision Directive 25, which reformed US policy on multilateral peace operations.[96] This policy was used as the basis to defend American decisions not to participate in Rwanda.

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What is not clear, however, is why the US took matters one step further and delayed the Security Council’s ability to respond more quickly in Rwanda. Clearly, other nations on the Security Council played a role in the delays, and one of the individuals who spoke to the Security Council in order to limit the international response was the representative from the interim government in Rwanda, which was at least passively supporting the genocide.[97] In addition, both France and Belgium had complicated histories with Rwanda, which were also factors in the Security Council’s deliberations. Belgium argued for complete withdrawal, while France ultimately initiated its own mission in one part of the country, although with the Security Council’s support.[98] The result was that UN assistance was effectively delayed until the fighting ceased.

The delay left Canada as the only country that provided airlift support to UNAMIR, but it was not the only nation that provided resources. Twenty-four nations contributed troops to UNAMIR throughout the crisis, so there was an international presence.[99] The presence was very small in comparison to the thousands of UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in the former Yugoslavia, but it demonstrated that there was some international agreement that action needed to be taken. The effort that was expended by Canada within the small UN presence was arguably the right thing to do and is an example of a situation where Canada’s interests deviate from other Western nations.

The machinations of national self-interest are impossible to accurately forecast, and it is conceivable that another Rwandan-type crisis could develop with limited international assistance. The world had changed after the Cold War, and the UN of the early 1990s was involved in missions everywhere, to varying degrees of success.[100] Since the 1990s, there has been less of a focus on UN missions by Canada, but that could change. There may be times when a crisis begins and a coalition effort is not possible due to other nations’ self-interests. Canada acted alone with airlift in Rwanda in 1994 and can do so again, despite the normal procedure of operating within a coalition environment. The capabilities of tactical airlift are such that the risks—within limits—involved are manageable and—in the case of Rwanda 1994—morally imperative. Operations conducted by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should include challenging tactical-airlift missions as a strategic Canadian response to a crisis.

A review of operations conducted by CAF before and after Rwanda reveals some interesting trends.[101] In the 10 years preceding the Rwanda operation, the CF responded to international mission requirements with 66 operations. Of those operations, 18 involved airlift and fully 13 of those operations were conducted only with transport resources. In the 20 years since the Rwandan operation, the CF responded with 155 operations. Over this period, 23 operations (or 15 per cent) involved airlift, and 12 of these operations were conducted solely with transport resources. The air-transport capability was used in 27 per cent of CF operations between 1984 and 1994 but in only 15 per cent of the CF operations between 1994 and 2014: a reduction of nearly 50 per cent. Clearly, the trend is moving away from the Canadian use of transport aircraft in international operations.

Airlift as a Canadian capability has actually expanded since Rwanda. Within the transport community, the tactical-airlift component in 1994 stood at 30 CC130 Hercules, but 13 of those Hercules were used for domestic search and rescue, so only 17 aircraft were available for tactical missions. Of those 17 aircraft, those fitted with CMS equipment were 25 to 30 years old.[102] Now, however, there are 17 CC130 J Model Hercules dedicated solely to tactical airlift. These new aircraft are state-of-the-art tactical aircraft that were delivered starting in 2010. In addition, Canada has five CC177 Globemaster III aircraft, fully tactically capable, for much larger loads. Tactical airlift in Canada has never been better equipped.

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The horrors of Rwanda went on while the world was focused on the former Yugoslavia. However, Canada responded admirably with a small detachment of airlift and authorized it to remain throughout the genocide. This airlift was essential for UNAMIR to remain in Kigali, and UNAMIR was essential to the international effort to assist with the resulting refugee crisis. The result was a UN presence that remained within the country at all times to act as a witness to events, keep communications open between warring factions and the international community as well as coordinate the response to the refugee crisis.

The use of tactical transport aircraft in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated the value of a Canadian military operation to UN objectives. If movement by road, rail or sea is not available, such as the situation in Rwanda, airlift is the only way to provide essential support to ongoing military operations. Food, water and medical evacuations are critical components of an ongoing military operation. An important factor for all such airlift operations is that the detachment does not need to work in a coalition environment. If the supported force is small, a detachment as small as a single CMS CC130 Hercules can prove sufficient to the requirements.

There are some conditions to operating transport aircraft into a dangerous environment. As the risk to the aircraft on the ground is so high, warring factions have to agree to allow the aircraft to land and depart safely. It is understood that not all elements of the factions will obey orders, but without the agreement, airlift will not succeed. As well, consideration needs to be given to the risk of handheld SAMs. Agreement between warring factions and a solid assumption that missiles will not be used represent the minimum requirements for successful tactical airlift.

The tactical-airlift capability in Canada is newer and larger than in 1994, but it has been used less regularly since that time. Given that the overall operational tempo of CAF has not decreased, that suggests a change in approach to crisis resolution that does not appear to take into account the success that airlift achieved in 1994. Recent and ongoing air operations have used detachments of CF188 Hornets (fighter-bomber aircraft conducting bombing missions), but will a review of those operations demonstrate a success such as, arguably, the airlift detachment in Rwanda in 1994? Before a definitive answer is reached, the Canadian tactical-airlift community needs to be used more often with the objective of recapturing the type of effect achieved in Rwanda.

Major James Pierotti is an air combat systems officer currently on postgraduate training at the Royal Military College of Canada for a Master of Arts in War Studies. He has five tours with the search-and-rescue community and commanded the Rescue Coordination Centre in Victoria from July 2009 to July 2012. He has experience as the Chief of Combat Rescue in Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2008 to April 2009, with the International Security Assistance Force. His earlier experience was in tactical airlift, on the CC130 Hercules, and as an electronic warfare officer on the CT133 Silver Star.

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ALCE―Air Lift Command Element
ATG―Air Transport Group
CAF―Canadian Armed Forces
CF―Canadian Forces
CMS―countermeasures system
DFAIT―Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DHH―Directorate of History and Heritage
DND―Department of National Defence
DOBIS―A database used by the National Library of Canada
RDP―Rwanda Documents Project
RGF―Rwandan Government Forces
RPF―Rwandan Patriotic Front
SAM―surface-to-air missile
SITREP―situation report
UN―United Nations
UNAMIR―United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
US―United States


[1]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 4.  (return)

[2]. UN, Security Council, S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/1994.shtml.  (return)

[3]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, 10 April to 28 September 1994, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH).  (return)

[4]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 405 and 497.  (return)

[5]. Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 20.  (return)

[6]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 16.  (return)

[7]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 241–42.  (return)

[8]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 96.  (return)

[9]. UN, Security Council, 30 March 1994, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Rwanda Documents Project (RDP).  (return)

[10]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 4.  (return)

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[11]. Republic of Rwanda, Independent Committee of Experts Investigating the Fatal Crash on 06 April 1994 of the Falcon 50 Plane with Registration Number 9XR-NN, Kigali: 20 April 1994.  (return)

[12]. Republic of Rwanda, Independent Committee of Experts Investigating the Fatal Crash on 06 April 1994 of the Falcon 50 Plane with Registration Number 9XR-NN, Kigali: 20 April 1994.  (return)

[13]. UN, Security Council, S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda.  (return)

[14]. UN, Security Council, S/1994/470, 20 April 1994, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, RDP Title 1994-04-20F, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.  (return)

[15]. “Systems Upgrades – Missions: Electronic Warfare Self Protection Suite (EWSPS) Integration and Installation,” Spar, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.dougalco.com/spar/apmil04.htm.  (return)

[16]. This author, a navigator, was one of those crewmembers with the required training, deployed to Op SCOTCH in April 1994 as an operations officer and in August of 1994 as a CMS-trained crewmember.  (return)

[17]. Op SCOTCH ATG Op Order 12 0345Z Apr 94, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 2.  (return)

[18]. Letter from Andre Ouellett [Minister DFAIT] to David Collenette [Minister of National Defence], dated 9 April 1994, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1.  (return)

[19]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 001, 10 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[20]. The names of the commander and staff of the ALCE will not be used because the personnel rotated monthly as was standard procedure at the time. Personnel would deploy with as little as 10 hours’ notice, so the limited time away from home reduced the disruption to family.  (return)

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[21]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 001, 10 April 1994, DHH  (return).

[22]. J3 Ops Note, Current CF Activities and Operations – 13 Apr 94, Rwanda Update as of 13 2200Z Apr 94, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 2.  (return)

[23]. All the information for this paragraph was taken from J3 Ops Note, Current CF Activities and Operations – 13 Apr 94, Rwanda Update as of 13 2200Z Apr 94, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 2, which contains an ATG flying schedule as of 13 2100Z Apr with details of the flights.  (return)

[24]. The distance is 400 nautical miles [740.8 kilometres] and the Hercules travels at 290 knots [537 kilometres per hour], but take-off, offloading and approaches all add up to require a full four hours from Nairobi to Kigali and back.  (return)

[25].  Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 005, 13 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[26]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 290–91.  (return)

[27]. UN, Security Council, 30 March 1994, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, RDP; and UN, Security Council, S/1994/470, 20 April 1994, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, RDP Title 1994-04-20F.  (return)

[28]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 011, 19 April 1994, DHH; and Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 010, 19 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[29]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 321.  (return)

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[30]. Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 15.  (return)

[31]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 405.  (return)

[32]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 352.  (return)

[33]. UN, Security Council, S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994, Resolution 912 (1994), accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1994.shtml. UNAMIR never reduced below 450 personnel, in contravention of the Security Council decision, but Dallaire’s rationale for keeping the additional personnel was supported by the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations.  (return)

[34]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 336; and Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 017, 22 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[35]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 017, 22 April 1994, DHH; and LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 335–36.  (return)

[36]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 018, 23 April 1994, DHH; and Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 020, 24 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[37]. This author was the operations officer at Nairobi airport 13–30 April and vividly recalls 101 Bangladeshi soldiers departing from one Hercules flight on 23 April.  (return)

[38]. DCDS [Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff] Tasking Order – Op SCOTCH 21 2153Z Apr 94, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1.  (return)

[39]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 025, 26 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

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[40]. Email from Colonel Roeterink to author, 18 August 2015. Then Lieutenant-Colonel Roeterink was the initial ALCE commander for Op SCOTCH.  (return)

[41]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 028, 28 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[42]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 033, 1 May 1994, DHH.  (return)

[43]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 036, 4  May 1994, DHH.  (return)

[44]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, WComd 087, 051829Z May 1994, DHH.  (return)

[45]. UN, Security Council, S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda.  (return)

[46]. Message from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in New York to DFAIT, 30 June 1994, UNAMIR-UN Request for Continuation of Airlift Support, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1.  (return)

[47]. A CC130 E model aircraft holds 20,000 lbs [9,075 kg] to 25,000 lbs [11,340 kg] on four pallets and still has room for up to 12 passengers. The limitation in Africa was the high temperatures, which limited the cargo load weight.  (return)

[48]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 024, 26 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[49]. Canadian Senate, Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence: Military Air Transport (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), 12. The number of passengers that could be carried is a ballpark figure based on a survey of the various SITREPs. If circumstances had warranted, this number could have been increased.  (return)

[50]. Captain Pierotti, journal from August 1994.  (return)

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[51]. Captain Pierotti, journal from August 1994.  (return)

[52]. UN, Security Council, S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, 8.  (return)

[53]. UNAMIR Outgoing Code Cable, To: Annan, From: Dallaire, 24 April 1994, Current Assessment of the Situation in Rwanda, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 2.  (return)

[54]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 358.  (return)

[55]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 055, 22 May 1994, DHH.  (return)

[56]. Captain Tony Keene, “River of Death,” DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1.  (return)

[57]. US, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems,” July 27, 2011, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/169139.htm.  (return)

[58]. This author viewed a video taken by Captain Jim Bertrand (Retired), a CC130 first officer, during a flight in the first month of the crisis. It is clear in the video that several men fired shots towards the aircraft, and this type of incident was a fairly regular occurrence.  (return)

[59]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 057, 24 May 1994, DHH.  (return)

[60]. The fact that a crew will manoeuvre an aircraft to avoid sustained ground fire is obvious; it is the angles and altitudes in the manoeuvre involved that are classified.  (return)

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[61]. Captain Tony Keene, “River of Death,” DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1.  (return)

[62]. Captain Tony Keene, “River of Death,” DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1.  (return)

[63]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 409.  (return)

[64]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 065, 1 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[65]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 072, 6 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[66]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 074, 8 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[67]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 102, 5 July 1994, DHH.  (return)

[68]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 083, Special, 17 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[69]. Op SCOTCH Significant Incident Report 05 1250Z Jun 94, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 1, Maj Hoddinnott.  (return)

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[70]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 335, 341 and 378.  (return)

[71]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 067, 3 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[72]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 068, 4 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[73]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 197.  (return)

[74]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 068, 4 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[75]. UN, Secretary-General, 20 June 1994, Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 4, RDP.  (return)

[76]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 082, 16 June 1994, DHH.  (return)

[77]. LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 427 and 432.  (return)

[78]. UN, Secretary-General, 20 June 1994, Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1, RDP.  (return)

[79]. UN, Security Council, S/1994/640, 31 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, 5, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/cgi-bin/library  (return).

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[80]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 128, 31 July 1994, DHH.  (return)

[81]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREP 186 and Final, 28 September 1994, DHH.  (return)

[82]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, SITREPs 020 to 128, 24 April to 1 August 1994, DHH.  (return)

[83]. Airlift Situation Reports – Op SCOTCH, DHH. The SITREPs identify receipt of all of the extensions received by the ALCE. Initially the extensions were one week at a time, but in May they extended to two weeks each.  (return)

[84]. Canada, Parliament of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 11 April to 21 June 1994, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HouseChamberBusiness/ChamberSittings.aspx?Key=1994&View=H&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=35&Ses=1.  (return)

[85]. J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military? (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2004), 166.  (return)

[86]. Memorandum, 13 April 1994, From: DFAIT, Director of International Security and Defence Relations, Daniel Dhavernas To: GAF, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 2. Although I could find no definition of “GAF,” it represents the West and Central African Division of the African Great Lakes Contribution Program.  (return)

[87]. Canada and the Situation in Rwanda and Burundi, DHH, Peacekeeping Records in Africa, Series 1, Missions and United Nations, Box 1, File 1-1 – Afrique – DOBIS (1994). I could find no definition of “DOBIS” but it is a database used by the National Library of Canada.  (return)

[88]. Canadian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations and Related Missions (Aug 94), DHH, Peacekeeping Records in Africa, Series 1, Missions and United Nations, Box 1, File 1-1 – Afrique – DOBIS (1994).  (return)

[89]. Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 13.  (return)

[90]. Robert C. Owen, Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 265.  (return)

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[91]. Walter A. Dorn, Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (United Kingdom: Henry King Limited, 2014), 201.  (return)

[92]. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Airlift Situation Reports – Op AIRBRIDGE, SITREP 612, 18 April 1994, DHH.  (return)

[93]. ATG Flying Schedule as of 13 2100Z Apr 94, DHH, Major Joost Fonds, Rwanda File 2.  (return)

[94]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 191.  (return)

[95]. UN, Secretary-General [Somalia], 31 May 1994, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 4 of Resolution 886 (1993), 5, DHH, Alan James Fonds.  (return)

[96]. US, White House, May 3, 1994, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, accessed December 16, 2015, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf.  (return)

[97]. L. R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 199.  (return)

[98].Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 13; and LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 427.  (return)

[99]. UN, Security Council, 30 March 1994, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 6, RDP.  (return)

[100]. Lev Voronkov, “International Peace and Security: New Challenges to the UN,” Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International Relations, The United Nations Special Issue 8, no. 2, (Winter 1994), DHH, Alan James Fonds; Alan James, “UN Peace-keeping: Recent Development and Current Problems,” Paradigms 8, no. 2; Benjamin Rivlin, “The UN Secretary-Generalship at Fifty,” Paradigms 8, no. 2, 57; and Peter R. Baehr, “Human Rights Organizations and the UN: A Tale of Two Worlds,” Paradigms 8, no. 2.  (return)

[101]. Canada, CAF, DHH, Canadian Forces International Missions and Operations, Database printout from March 2015. All of the data in this paragraph comes from this source. It is a document that is maintained by military staff at DHH and was obtained from Major Mathias Joost, May 28, 2015.  (return)

[102]. R. W. R. Walker, Canadian Military Aircraft Serial Numbers, Canadian Armed Forces CC130 Hercules Detailed List, accessed December 16, 2015, http://rwrwalker.ca/CF_CC130.html.  (return)

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