

provides examples of good leadership that he experienced while serving in an Army unit and emphasizes that the problems of ineffectual leadership are more prevalent within the Air Force than the CF as a whole. Mr. Boyle ends the book with his conclusions and recommendations on how the CF could address the problems he has cited in order to improve the leadership in the Air Force.

This book would have benefited from being edited by an independent and unbiased individual. Many segments are long, tedious monologues by the author. As a result the points that he is making can be lost to the reader. As well, Mr. Boyle repeats his views of the officer corps numerous times. He believes that they resemble a herd of elephants that will circle themselves around the wounded, face outwards, and defend the injured to their own death.<sup>2</sup> Even though the metaphor is appropriate, in his view, and one that some readers will agree with, by the time that it


<sup>2</sup> Boyle, 56.

is repeated the fourth and fifth times, it has become tiresome and will sway the opinion of the unbiased reader.

Putting aside the poor editing, this book will provoke military members, both those who served before SHARP training and also those who joined after the program was made mandatory, to reflect upon their own careers (before and after SHARP) and make a personal assessment on whether the military has been successful in reducing harassment and racism in the workplace. It will also encourage readers to form their own opinions of the leadership in the CF, consider how it has evolved during their careers, and judge whether the changes were good or bad.

Overall, this book deserves to be read, preferably with an open and unbiased mind. A reader will come to either agree with Mr. Boyle or will vehemently deny that such incidents could be true. But it is certainly a book that can incite lively discussions among serving and retired military members. ■

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# CANADA IN NORAD 1957 - 2007: A HISTORY

**BY JOSEPH T. JOCKEL**

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Review by Major Bill March

Dr. Joseph Jockel, currently with the Department of Canadian Studies at St. Lawrence University in New York state, is no stranger to the melodrama that is the Canada - US defence relationship. He has authored, or co-authored, several excellent books on the

subject and *Canada in NORAD 1957- 2007: A History* is an important addition to his body of work. It is a well-researched and very readable examination of the history of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); which, for the last fifty years,

has arguably been the centre-piece for defence cooperation with our neighbours to the south.

Dr. Jockel begins in his first chapter, as they say, at the beginning by looking at the signing of the original air defence agreements in 1957 and 1958. Agreements is not a “typo.” In September 1957, NORAD was officially stood-up as a bi-national command with United States Air Force (USAF) General Earle E. Partridge as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon as the Deputy CINC. As agreed to by the fledgling Conservative government of John Diefenbaker, NORAD was designed to integrate the air defences of both countries to defend against a Soviet bomber attack. However, in the mid-1950s both attack and defence meant a reliance on nuclear weapons with Canada as the potential battleground. Therefore, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) sought to make NORAD more than just a military-to-military body. In May 1958 an exchange of notes between the DEA and the US State Department emphasized the need for “the fullest possible consultation between the two Governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America.”<sup>1</sup> Debated and approved by Parliament in June, this “diplomatic” NORAD agreement provided, so it was believed in Ottawa, a conduit for a Canadian voice in issues that might have a direct impact on national survival.

As Jockel points out in the subsequent two chapters, titled “Air Turbulence 1958 – 1968” and “Trudeau and Aerospace Defence,” the issues of nuclear weapons and bi-national consultation dominated Canada’s approach to NORAD throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Although NORAD provided an element of protection for the US North American-based strategic nuclear deterrent, it was the need to employ nuclear weapons in this role that caused the greatest angst in Canada. Notwithstanding the acquisition of the CF101 Voodoo interceptor and Bomarc surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, both of which required nuclear weapons to be effective, successive Canadian governments attempted to distance themselves from the entire subject.

Bi-national consultation was also a thorn in the Canadian government’s side. Although Ottawa felt that the NORAD agreement made such consultation mandatory, the US did not have the same view. Therefore, a perceived lack of communication between the two nations during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crises and the 1973

Yom Kippur War (both events triggered an increase in the alert status of US forces) generated an element of concern within Ottawa. With Canadian and US air defence forces “joined-at-the-hip,” it appeared impossible, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to increase the alert status of one partner in the bi-national defence apparatus without automatically doing the same for the other. For this to happen without Canadian government approval of or, at a bare minimum, input into the decision was a continuing source of frustration. As a partial remedy to this situation, coupled with Trudeau’s focus on national sovereignty, there was a gradual “repatriation” of Canadian assets and the eventual formation of the Canadian NORAD region.

Even while the political ramifications of these issues were being dealt with, NORAD was evolving. As the potential threat to North America swung from the manned-bomber to ballistic missiles, NORAD downgraded its manned-interceptor role and gradually adopted space surveillance and missile-warning/assessment tasks. Canada had concerns with these new roles, specifically how NORAD would fit in to the US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and the potential weaponization of space, but nevertheless approved in the early 1980s an official change in name (and focus) to North American Aerospace Defense Command.<sup>2</sup>

Chapters Four and Five look at the growing importance of space within NORAD and, with the end of the Cold War, the acquisition of additional roles. Jockel highlights the struggle to balance the military requirement to build upon the NORAD relationship to safe-guard Canadian Forces’ access to space-related information and services, with the Government’s desire not to become engaged in the strategic defense initiative (SDI) and missile defence. At the same time, NORAD had to adjust to the reduction in the Soviet (now Russian) threat to North America. Counter-drug operations was added to NORAD’s lexicon as a new responsibility partly in an attempt to find a new *raison d’être* for the bi-national command, but also partly in response to the challenging reality of asymmetric threats.

Just how real these threats were was brought home to the world on 11 September 2001. Oriented to defend against an external attack on North America, Jockel notes in Chapter Six that NORAD was neither designed nor prepared

1. J.T. Jockel, *Canada in NORAD 1957 – 2007: A History* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 36.

2. From its inception in 1957, the original name was North American Air Defense Command. The 1980 name change reflected the growing importance of space within NORAD operations.

to deal with an airborne terrorist threat from within. NORAD would implement a series of operations dubbed NOBLE EAGLE that saw US and Canadian fighter aircraft providing top-cover over select cities and vital installations within their respective countries. Both Canada and the US also instituted changes within their military organizations to deal with the new threats. The Americans created a new unified command, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) which for the first time had North America as its operational focus. In 2006, Canada followed suit with the establishment of Canada Command (Canada COM) which has a similar focus to that of USNORTHCOM. With the creation of these two bodies, the relevance of NORAD was called into question. However, as both countries adapted their respective defence organizations in order to increase the importance of homeland defence, the governments of both nations found it difficult to relinquish the practical ties and bi-national trust represented by NORAD. In 2006 the NORAD agreement was re-signed, this time without a formal expiration date. Undoubtedly, the relationship between NORAD, USNORTHCOM and Canada COM will continue to evolve, but at least for the foreseeable future, argues Jockel, NORAD will continue to exist.

With only a few minor editorial errors, Jockel has laid out in an easy to follow chronological format a history of NORAD. In tracing the evolution of NORAD, he provides some contextual background with respect to Canadian and US political issues that were

prevalent during the various periods in which he breaks down the story. And although he does the same for the US Air Force, Jockel does not provide the same level of detail on the internal organizational pressures facing the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and its successors within the Canadian Forces. For example, although he goes to great lengths to explain how the US grappled with the control of air defence assets assigned to NORAD and national commands, there is scant mention of organizational changes to Canada's Air Force, such as unification or the creation of Air Command in 1975, and how they might have impacted NORAD. This level of detail may have been beyond the scope of this publication, but it is a significant gap in the narrative.

Why should this book be of interest to members of the Canadian aerospace community? My minor criticisms aside, Jockel's book chronicles an agency that has been the cornerstone of Canada's defence relationship with the US for over fifty years. As such, a more thorough understanding of how politics, organizational pressures and personal relationships combined to influence its evolution is beneficial. Aerospace defence remains a critical element of national security and it behoves us to ensure that NORAD continues to play a relevant role and that these concerns are addressed where appropriate. Therefore, knowledge of how NORAD evolved may stand us in good stead as the nation attempts to forge new defence relationships with the US in general and USNORTHCOM in particular. ■

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